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Abstract
This paper presents a privacy-preserving network oriented to-
wards medical image analysis. Our approach is based on ad-
versarial learning which encodes images to obfuscate the pa-
tient identity while preserving enough information for a tar-
get task. Our novel architecture is composed of three compo-
nents: 1) an encoder network which removes identity-specific
features from input medical images, 2) a discriminator net-
work that attempts to identify the subject from the encoded
images, 3) a medical image analysis network which analyzes
the content of the encoded images (segmentation in our case).
By simultaneously fooling the discriminator and optimizing
the medical analysis network, the encoder learns to remove
privacy-specific features while keeping those essentials for
the target task. Our approach is illustrated on the problem
of segmenting brain MRI from the large-scale Parkinson Pro-
gression Marker Initiative (PPMI) dataset. Using longitudi-
nal data from PPMI, we show that the discriminator learns to
heavily distort input images while allowing for highly accu-
rate segmentation results.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models like deep convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) have achieved outstanding performances in
complex medical imaging tasks such as segmentation, reg-
istration, and disease detection (Zhou, Greenspan, and Shen
2017; Litjens et al. 2017). However, privacy restrictions on
medical data including images impede the development of
centralized cloud-based image analysis systems, a solution
that has its share of benefits: no on-site specialized hard-
ware, immediate trouble shooting or easy software and hard-
ware updates, among others.
While server-to-client encryption can prevent attacks
from outside the system, it cannot prevent cybercriminals
within the system from gaining access to private medical
data. Nowadays, the standard approach to obfuscate the
identity of a patient is to anonymize its data. In case of im-
ages, this is done by removing the patient-related DICOM
tags or by converting it into a tag-free format such as PNG
or NIFTI. However, as shown by Kumar et al. (Kumar et al.
2018) and further illustrated in this paper, the raw content
of an image can be easily used to recover the identity of a
person with up to 97% of accuracy.
A recent solution to such problem has been federated
learning (McMahan et al. 2017), which allows to collabo-
ratively train a centralized model while keeping the training
data decentralized. The idea behind this strategy is to trans-
fer the training gradients of a data instead of the data itself.
While such approach is appealing to train a neural network
with data hosted in different hospitals, it does not allow the
use of a centralized cloud-based model for making predic-
tion at test time.
In this paper, we propose a system that encodes medical
images into a format that preserves the identity of a patient
while keeping enough semantic information to analyze its
content with high accuracy. We achieve this with an adver-
sarial learning approach inspired by generative adversarial
networks (GAN) (Luc et al. 2016; Goodfellow et al. 2014;
Ganin et al. 2016) but with two main differences. As illus-
trated in Fig. 1, instead of being a two-player game, our sys-
tem involves three players: i) an image encoder, ii) a dis-
criminator and iii) a medical image analysis network (a seg-
mentation CNN in our case). Whereas the encoder’s objec-
tive is to obfuscate the content of a raw input image, the
goal of the discriminator is to determine whether two im-
ages come from the same patient or not. The third player is
a network which analyzes the content of the encoded image.
As such, while the encoder tries to fool the discriminator, it
must preserve enough information to allow the third network
to successfully analyze its content. At test time, the encoder
network is deployed on the client side which converts a raw
image x into an encoded (and yet secure) image z. There-
after, z is transferred to the cloud-based server where the
segmentation network is deployed. The resulting segmenta-
tion map ŷ is then sent back to the client.
The major contributions of this work are as follows:
• We present the first privacy-preserving model for seman-
tic image segmentation. Obfuscating identity while pre-
serving task-specific information is particularly challeng-
ing for segmentation, which requires to assign a label for
each image pixel.
• Our model proposes a novel architecture combining two
CNNs for the encoder and segmentation networks with
a Siamese CNN for the discriminator. This Siamese dis-
criminator learns identity-discriminative features from
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Figure 1: Training configuration of our proposed system: a) an encoder network E converts input images xi and xj into two
new images zi and zj , b) the discriminator network D tries to determine if the input images it is fed with come from the same
patient (sij = 1) or not (sij = 0) and c) the segmentation network S segments the encoder images. At test time (dotted lines),
the discriminator is removed from the system and the encoder and the segmentation network are fed with a single image.
images pairs instead of a single image, allowing us to
have a variable number of classes (i.e., subject IDs). Un-
like the work in (Oleszkiewicz et al. 2018), our model is
trained using both an adversarial Siamese loss and a task-
specific loss, thereby providing encoded images that ob-
fuscate identity while preserving the information required
for the target task.
• We demonstrate that the privacy-preserving encoder
learned with a given dataset can be used to encode im-
ages from another dataset, and that these encoded images
are useful to update the segmentation network.
The next section gives an overview of related works on
privacy-preserving models for image-related tasks, with a
particular emphasis on adversarial learning techniques. Sec-
tion 3 then presents the proposed model and loss functions
used for training. In Section 4, we demonstrate the useful-
ness of our model on the problem of brain MRI segmenta-
tion from two benchmark datasets. Last, we conclude with a
summary and discussion of key results.
2 Related Work
Privacy preserving in visual tasks. Traditional methods
to preserve privacy rely on cryptographic approaches (Ziad
et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2017) which create local homo-
morphic encryptions of visual data. Although these methods
perform well in some applications, homomorphic cryptosys-
tems typically incur high computational costs (Paillier 1999)
and are mostly restricted to simple linear classifiers. This
limits their usability in scenarios requiring more complex
models like deep neural networks. Another solution consists
in extracting feature descriptors from raw images, which are
then transferred to the encrypted dataset server (Hsu, Lu, and
Pei 2011). Nevertheless, sensitive information from original
images can be still recovered from standard features, mak-
ing these systems vulnerable to cyberattacks. An alternative
strategy is to employ low-resolution images (Dai et al. 2015;
Chen et al. 2016) or image filtering techniques (Butler et
al. 2015; Jalal, Uddin, and Kim 2012) to degrade sensitive
information. However, since these approaches also reduce
the quality of the visual content, they are limited to a re-
duced set of tasks such as action or face expression recog-
nition. More recently, McClure et al. (McClure et al. 2018)
proposed using continual learning to circumvent the issue
of privacy preservation in the context of multi-center brain
tumor segmentation. Nevertheless, unlike our method, their
approach is not directly optimized to obfuscate identity from
visual data.
Federated learning Federate learning has recently
emerged as a solution to build machine learning mod-
els based on distributed data sets while preventing
data leakage (Xie et al. 2014; Konecny´ et al. 2016;
Hesamifard, Takabi, and Ghasemi 2017;
McMahan et al. 2016; Vepakomma et al. 2018;
Yang et al. 2019). With this approach, the learning
process involves collaboration from all the data owners
without exposing their data to others. This can typically
be achieved by sharing the architecture and parameters
between the client and server during training, along with
intermediate representations of the model that may include
the gradients, activations and weight updates. Thus, the
client downloads the model from the server and updates
the weights based on its local data. Yet, a major drawback
of these strategies is their huge requirements for network
bandwidth, memory and computational power, which
strongly limits their scalability.
Privacy preserving with adversarial learning. The re-
cent success of adversarial learning has led to the increased
adoption of this technique for the protection of sensitive in-
formation, particularly in visual data. Xu et al. (Xu et al.
2019) proposed to add carefully-designed noise to gradi-
ents during the learning procedure to train a differentially-
private GAN in the context of image recognition. An un-
supervised utility loss is employed for training in (Raval,
Machanavajjhala, and Cox 2017), based on the assumption
that removing private characteristics from an image while
minimizing changes to the rest of the image yields encoded
representations that can be used to learn a target task. How-
ever, since the encoding is performed independently of the
task, it is potentially sub-optimal for this task. Other works
(Pittaluga, Koppal, and Chakrabarti 2019; Wu et al. 2018;
Yang et al. 2018; Roy and Boddeti 2019) have leveraged
adversarial training to jointly optimize privacy and utility
objectives. In these works, the mapping functions for the ad-
versarial and task-specific terms are standard classification
models where the number of classes is fixed. In (Chen, Kon-
rad, and Ishwar 2018), a model which integrates a Varia-
tional Autoencoder (VAE) and a GAN is proposed to create
an identity-invariant representation of face images. To ex-
plicitly control the features to be preserved, they include a
discriminator which must predict the identity of the subject
in a generated image. As the number of possible labels cor-
responds to the number of subjects to identify, this approach
is not suitable for large-scale applications as the one consid-
ered in our work. To alleviate this problem, (Oleszkiewicz
et al. 2018) instead uses a Siamese architecture for the
discriminator, which predicts whether two encoded images
come from the same subject. In this previous work, an auto-
encoder loss is employed as task-agnostic utility objective
to avoid the encoder from generating trivial images. In con-
trast, our privacy-preserving method considers a loss spe-
cific to the task of semantic segmentation.
3 Methodology
Proposed system
As shown in Fig. 1, our system implements a three-player
zero-sum game where each player is an independent CNN.
At the input of our system is a raw image x ∈ RH×W×D (in
our case a 3D T1 MR image). During training, images come
in pair (xi,xj) ∈ X 2, i 6= j, and are associated to a binary
target sij which is 1 when xi and xj come from the same
patient and 0 otherwise. Each image is also associated with a
ground-truth segmentation map pair (yi,yj). As mentioned
in Section 4, pairs of images from the same patient are not
identical as they were acquired during different acquisition
sessions, often months apart.
The first player is an encoder network E parameterized
by θE . The output of the encoder is an encoded image
z ∈ RH×W×D. While training the system, the encoder is
fed with a pair of images (xi,xj) and returns two encoded
images zi and zj . Here, xi and xj are processed individually
and not concatenated together.
The second player is the Siamese discriminator network
D with parameters θD, which is fed with a pair of images.
The goal of this network is to determine if the two images
come from the same patient or not. By fooling D (i.e., max-
imizing its loss), the encoder provides transformed images
that cannot be used to identify patient. Let z = E(x), to
learn all possible cases, D is given six different types of
image pairs, namely: (xi,xj), (zi, zj), (xi, zi), (xj , zj),
(xi, zj) and (xj , zi).
Last, the third player is the segmentation network S hav-
ing parameters θS and whose goal if to recover the cor-
rect segmentation map y given the encoded image z. During
training, both zi and zj are segmented.
Training losses
Like most adversarial model, our system is trained with two
losses that steers the model in opposite directions. In our
case, the training procedure involves a segmentation loss and
an adversarial loss :
min
θE ,θS
max
θD
L(θE , θS , θD) = Ex,y∼X ,Y
[Lseg(S(E(x)),y)]
− λExi,xj∼X 2
[
Ladv
(
xi,xj , sij ; θD, θE
)]
(1)
where Lseg is attached to the segmentation network, Ladv is
attached to the discriminator, and sij = 1
(
id(xi) = id(xj)
)
is a binary indicator function indicating if two images come
from the same person or not.
Using ŷ = S(E(x)) as shorthand notation for the pre-
dicted segmentation map, we employ the generalized Dice
loss (Sudre et al. 2017) to train the segmentation network,
i.e.
Lseg(ŷ,y) = 1 −
2
∑
p yp ŷp∑
p yp +
∑
p ŷp
. (2)
For the adversarial loss, we want the discriminator to dif-
ferentiate subject identity in pairs of non-encoded images
(xi,xj), encoded images (zi, zj) or a mix of both (xi, zj).
Since the encoded images are outputted by E, we can for-
mulate this loss as
Ladv
(
xi,xj , sij ; θD, θE
)
= Ldis
(
D(xi,xj), sij
)
+ (3)
Ldis
(
D(E(xi),xj), sij
)
+ Ldis
(
D(E(xi), E(xj)), sij
)
.
Here, the discriminator loss Ldis is a binary cross entropy:
Ldis(ŝ, s) = −s log ŝ − (1− s) log(1− ŝ). (4)
Like most adversarial models, the parameters of our sys-
tem cannot be updated all at once through a gradient step.
Instead, we first update the encoder and segmentation pa-
rameters θD, θE by taking the following gradient descent
step:
(θt+1S , θ
t+1
E ) ← (θtS , θtE) − η∇L˜(θtE , θtS). (5)
The gradient is estimated using random batches of image
pairs B ⊂ |X |×|X |, as follows:
∇L˜(θE , θS) = 1|B|
∑
(i,j)∈B
∇θE ,θS
[
Lseg(ŷi,yi) − (6)
λLdis
(
D(E(xi),xj), sij
)− λLdis(D(E(xi), E(xj)), sij)]
We then update the discriminator parameters by taking a gra-
dient ascent step
θt+1D ← θtD + η∇L˜(θtD) (7)
with the batch gradient computed as
∇L˜(θD) = − λ|B|
∑
(i,j)∈B
∇θD
[
Ldis
(
D(xi,xj), sij
)
+ (8)
Ldis
(
D(E(xi),xj), sij
)
+ Ldis
(
D(E(xi), E(xj)), sij
)]
.
Details of our training method are shown in Algo. 1.
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving network learning
Input: Images X and ground-truth masks Y
Output: Network parameters θE , θD, θS
/* Initialization */
Initialize network parameters θE , θD, θS ;
/* Main loop */
for epoch = 1, . . . , Emax do
for iter = 1, . . . , Tmax do
Randomly select batch B ⊂ |X |×|X |;
Update encoder and segmentation network
parameters (θS , θE) using Eq. (5) and (6);
Update discriminator parameters (θD) using Eq.
(7) and (8);
return θE , θD, θS ;
Implementation Details
In this study, we used a U-Net architecture as in (Ron-
neberger, Fischer, and Brox 2015) but with 3D convolution
kernels both for the encoder and the segmentation network.
The discriminator is a Siamese network as in (Koch, Zemel,
and Salakhutdinov 2015). We used a DenseNet architecture
(Huang, Liu, and Weinberger 2017) with 3D convolution
kernels for the CNN backbone. The CNN Siamese back-
bone (i.e. the left-most CNN inside the Discriminator box
in Fig. 1) is used to extract the features of input images. The
last layer of the discriminator contains two fully-connected
layers to predict if two images are from the same patient.
Further details on the networks are reported in the supple-
mentary material.
The system was implemented with Pytorch. We used
the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 10−4 for the
whole training process. The PC used for training is an In-
tel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700K 4.0GHz CPU, equipped with a
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080Ti GPU with 12 GB of mem-
ory. The training our networks takes roughly 30 minutes per
epoch, and around 2 days for the fully-trained system.
Since our networks employ 3D convolutions, and due to
the large size of MRI volumes, dense training cannot be ap-
plied to the whole volume. Instead, volumes are split into
smaller patches of 64 × 64 × 64, which allows dense train-
ing in our hardware setting. The encoder is initialized with
the weights of an auto-encoder, the segmentation network
was pre-trained on the original images and the discriminator
was pre-trained on the PPMI dataset.
4 Experimental results
Datasets
PPMI We experiment on brain tissue segmentation of 5
classes: white matter (WM), gray matter (GM), nuclei, inter-
nal cerebrospinal fluid (CSF int.) and external cerebrospinal
fluid (CSF ext.). We used the T1 images of the publicly-
available Parkinson’s Progression Marker Initiative (PPMI)
dataset (Marek et al. 2011). We took images from 350 sub-
jects, most of which with a recently diagnosed Parkinson
Training Testing Total
Nb subjects 269 81 350
Nb images 592 181 773
Nb positive pairs 509 148 657
Table 1: PPMI data used for training and testing our method.
disease. Each subject underwent one or two baseline acqui-
sitions and one or two acquisitions 12 months later for a total
of 773 images. PPMI MR images were acquired with stan-
dardized protocol used on Siemens Tim Trio and Siemens
Verio 3 Tesla machines from 32 different sites. The images
have been registered onto a common MNI space and resized
to 144 × 192 × 160 with a 1 mm3 resolution. More infor-
mation on the MRI acquisition and processing can be found
online: www.ppmi-info.org.
The dataset was divided into a training and a testing part
as shown in Table 1. In order to keep a good balance be-
tween the pair of images, during training and testing, we
randomly sampled and equal number of negative and pos-
itive samples. The segmentation ground-truth has been ob-
tained with Freesurfer.
MRBrainS To further validate the proposed method and
investigate its generalization ability, we also tested it on
segmenting MRI scans from the MRBrainS 2013 chal-
lenge dataset (Mendrik et al. 2015). These images were ac-
quired on a 3.0T Philips Achieva MR scanner and come
with expert-annotated segmentation masks including three
classes: WM, GM and CSF. We employed a single modality
(i.e., MR-T1) in our experiments. Bias correction was per-
formed as a pre-processing step. Original images had a res-
olution of 0.96×0.96×3mm3 and were registered onto the
MNI space using ANTs (Avants et al. 2011).
Evaluation metrics
To gauge the performance of our system, we use the classifi-
cation accuracy for the discriminator and the Dice score for
the segmentation results. We also use the MS-SSIM score
to measure image-to-image distance as a proxy of perceived
image quality (Wang, Simoncelli, and Bovik 2003).
Results
Baseline results At first, we processed the dataset with-
out the adversarial component, i.e, by independently train-
ing the segmentation and the discriminator networks with-
out the encoder. We call this setting Baseline in our results.
In the first row of Table 2, we see that the discriminator
obtains a testing accuracy of 95.3%. This underlines how
easy it is for a neural network to recognize a patient based
on the content of a brain MRI. More surprising is the 97%
classification accuracy that we get by simply thresholding
the image-to-image MS-SSIM score. This can be explained
by the inter- and intra-subject MS-SSIM distribution plots
shown in the third row of the first column of Fig. 2. As can
be seen, when considering non-encoded images, the intra-
subject MS-SSIM scores (red curve) are significantly larger
than that of the inter-subjects (blue curve). This again illus-
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Figure 2: Impact of discriminator loss (λ). [First column] (Top row): input MRI image x, (Second row): ground truth segmen-
tation map y, (Third row): distribution of inter- and intra-subject MS-SSIM score on the PPMI dataset. [Remaining columns],
(Top row): encoded image z, (Second row): predicted segmentation ŷ and (Third row): distribution of MS-SSIM values between
encoded images (zi, zj) (Last row): distribution of MS-SSIM values between non-encoded and encoded images (xi, zj).
trate the ease of recognizing the identity of a person based
on the content of a medical image.
The PPMI segmentation baseline Dice scores for the five
regions are in the first row of Table 3. We also report the
overall Dice computed as the mean of Dice scores in all
regions, weighted by the regions’ size. These results corre-
spond roughly to those obtained in recent publications (Dolz
et al. 2019). Note that the nuclei and the internal CSF have
a lower Dice due to the smaller size of these regions.
Discr. MS-SSIM
(xi,xj) — 0.953 0.970
(zi, zj)
λ=1 0.520 0.564
λ=3 0.537 0.533
λ=10 0.523 0.510
λ=100 0.516 0.503
(xi, zj)
λ=1 0.557 0.686
λ=3 0.517 0.662
λ=10 0.531 0.611
λ=100 0.524 0.527
Table 2: Same-subject prediction accuracy on test examples
using the discriminator or by thresholding MS-SSIM scores.
Performance is reported for pairs of non-encoded images
(xi,xj), pairs of encoded images (zi, zj) or mixed pairs
(xi, zj), and for different λ values.
GM WM Nuclei CSF int. CSF ext. Overall
Baseline 0.941 0.853 0.657 0.665 0.825 0.848
λ = 1 0.925 0.824 0.580 0.598 0.752 0.812
λ = 3 0.899 0.793 0.549 0.550 0.693 0.778
λ = 10 0.881 0.796 0.555 0.531 0.685 0.771
λ = 100 0.847 0.692 0.454 0.405 0.513 0.684
Table 3: Segmentation Dice score on the PPMI test set for
different values of λ. Baseline refers to the model trained
with non-encoded images.
Adversarial results We report adversarial results obtained
with different values of parameter λ, which controls the
trade-off between segmentation accuracy and identity obfus-
cation. The first row of Fig. 2 shows encoded images z next
to the raw input MRI x. As can be seen, the larger the λ value
is, the more distorted the encoded image gets. Nonetheless,
except for extreme cases (e.g., λ = 100) the encoded im-
ages contain enough information for the segmentation net-
work to recover a good segmentation map (c.f., the second
row of Fig. 2). The obfuscating power of our method is also
illustrated by the MS-SSIM plots (c.f., the last two rows of
Fig. 2). As λ increases, the distribution of inter-subject MS-
SSIM between encoded images (zi, zj) becomes more and
more similar to that of intra-subjects. The same situation ap-
pears between non-encoded and encoded images (xi, zj).
The recognition scores in Table 2 show the same trend, with
Baseline λ = 1 λ = 3 λ = 10 λ = 100
Figure 3: Test results on the MRBrainS dataset. [First column] (Top row): input MRI image x, (Bottom row): ground truth
segmentation map y. [Remaining columns], (Top row): encoded image z, (Bottom row): predicted segmentation ŷ with re-
trained segmentation networks on MRBrainS
MS-SSIM classification rates dropping as λ increases.
These results underline the fact that the encoder does not
only change image intensity values, but also the structure
of the image. Our system thus prevents from recognizing
the identity of a patient both when considering an encoded
image pair (zi, zj) as well as an encoded and non-encoded
image pair (xi, zj). Furthermore, despite these structural
changes, the segmentation network can still recover good
segmentation maps, even for λ=10 (c.f., Table 3).
Generalization to newly acquired data A large dataset
such as PPMI with per-patient longitudinal data is required
to train end-to-end our system. However, once trained, the
encoder can be fixed and used as an identity obfuscation
module to train the segmentation network on newly acquired
images. In order to illustrate this, we used images from the
MRBrainS dataset which were acquired with a different ac-
quisition protocol than PPMI and have three labels instead
of five, i.e., WM, GM, and CSF.
We first tested on MRBrainS images our model pre-
trained with PPMI data. In order to match the three-class
ground-truth, we merged the CSF int. and CSF ext. outputs
into a single CSF class, and the GM and nuclei outputs into
a single GM class. Results for different λ values are shown
at the top of Table 4. As expected, these results are slightly
worse than those on PPMI (see Table 3).
However, as can be seen at the bottom of Table 4, segmen-
tation accuracy improves when retraining the segmentation
network on MRBrainS data while keeping the encoder fixed.
This shows that the segmentation network of our system can
be updated, even after being deployed onto a cloud server.
Segmentation maps as well as encoded MRBrainS images
are given in Fig 3.
Robustness analysis To make sure that our system does
not work only on high-quality images such as those of PPMI,
we performed a robustness analysis where we trained our
method on the original PPMI dataset (with λ = 1) and tested
it on noisy versions of the PPMI test images or on images
with a lower 2× 2× 2 cm3 resolution. Results are provided
GM WM CSF Overall
No retrain
λ = 1 0.768 0.822 0.804 0.796
λ = 3 0.767 0.852 0.798 0.804
λ = 10 0.757 0.798 0.768 0.772
λ = 100 0.499 0.464 0.648 0.537
Retrain
λ = 1 0.819 0.827 0.823 0.821
λ = 3 0.794 0.807 0.831 0.814
λ = 10 0.780 0.747 0.797 0.790
λ = 100 0.605 0.360 0.572 0.586
Table 4: Segmentation Dice score on the MRBrainS dataset
for different values of λ. (Top) The networks has not been
retrained on MRBrainS images (Bottom) only the segmen-
tation network has been retrained, the encoded.
GM WM Nuclei CSF int. CSF ext. Overall
Noise (15dB) 0.921 0.818 0.572 0.585 0.743 0.808
Noise (10dB) 0.917 0.804 0.566 0.582 0.696 0.797
Noise (5dB) 0.821 0.706 0.514 0.472 0.331 0.669
Low res. 0.881 0.781 0.552 0.516 0.683 0.759
Table 5: Segmentation Dice score on PPMI dataset with dif-
ferent levels of Rician noise (measured in SNR dB) and low
resolution setting.
in Fig. 4 and Table 5. As can be seen, the encoding and seg-
mentation is not much affected by noise. The segmentation
accuracy is close to the one obtained on the original PPMI
test set, with overall Dice scores around 80% for noisy im-
ages with an SNR of 15db or 10db. Reducing image reso-
lution seems to induce more significant changes in the en-
coding, however the segmentation network appears robust
to these changes.
Runtime In terms of runtime, an average of 0.08 second
is required to encode an image on a NVIDIA GTX 1080Ti,
whereas the entire segmentation process requires around 0.1
seconds per image. This runtime is negligible compared to
the 8 to 12 hours required by Freesurfer. Training curves
SNR = 15db SNR = 10db SNR = 5db Low resolution
Figure 4: Segmentation with different noise level and a lower resolution setting. (Top row): Degraded images, (Middle row):
Encoded images, (Bottom row): Segmentation Results
illustrating the evolution of different loss terms and perfor-
mance metrics can be found in the supplementary material.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this work, we presented a novel framework which inte-
grates an encoder, a segmentation CNN and a Siamese net-
work to preserve the privacy of medical imaging data. Ex-
perimental results on two independent datasets have shown
that the proposed method can preserve the identity of a pa-
tient while maintaining the performance on the target task.
While this is an interesting application per se, it opens the
door to appealing potential uses. For example, this approach
can be integrated in a continual learning scenario trained
on a decentralized dataset, where images have to be shared
across institutions but privacy needs to be preserved. From a
clinical perspective, obfuscating visual data in addition to
current anonymization techniques may foster multi-centre
collaborations, resulting in larger datasets as well as more
complete and heterogeneous clinical studies.
Additionally, we have shown that the proposed privacy-
preserving model generalizes well to novel datasets, unlike
similar works (Chen, Konrad, and Ishwar 2018) which can-
not generalize to encoded images of subjects not seen in
training. This facilitates the scalability of our approach to
new datasets or tasks. As preliminary step towards prevent-
ing privacy leakage in medical imaging data, this study has
however some limitations. For example, the domain shift
between employed datasets is not significantly large, since
both include MRI images of adult brains (even though the
acquisition protocols and parameters across scanners differ).
Although similar domain shift has resulted in a performance
degradation in segmentation networks (Dolz, Desrosiers,
and Ayed 2018), results demonstrate the good generability
of the proposed method in these cases. Future investigations
will explore the generalization capabilities of the trained en-
coder on datasets where the domain shift is larger, for exam-
ple, between infant and adult brains or even between differ-
ent image modalities such as MRI and CT.
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